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COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL CONTROL-APPELLATE REVIEW
OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS-During its fortyfive year life the Federal Trade Commission has gone through
some difficult periods to emerge today as one of the fundamental
instrumentalities of government in the regulation of business.
Its vast powers and influence, well known to lawyers, will not
be explored here. Rather, the purpose of this comment is to
appraise the extent of control which the judiciary now exercises
over the commission in its adjudicative functions, so as to offer
some indication to the practitioner of the probabilities regarding the outcome of judicial review on an appeal beyond the full
commission. The approach to be used will be a study of Supreme
Court cases involving the commission since 1914 along with a
review of Federal Trade Commission cases that have been before
the courts of appeals since 1947.
While the use of statistics is subject to at least some skepticism
when the improbabilities of judicial review are involved, statistics
here provide a helpful introduction and point of departure. The
table presented below is based on a review of 106 cases cited in
the 99 recent volumes of the Federal Reporter, Second Series. 1
The study covers only cases in which the courts were reviewing
substantive decisions of the commission acting in an adjudicative
capacity. Thus, all cases involving subpoenas or the enjoining
of trade practice rules are omitted. In addition, those cases which
were affirmed per curiam and without comment and those raising other problems not here relevant are not included.
The number of cases reviewed by the courts of appeals has
increased over the past decade. There were four in 1948, sixteen
in 1957 and eleven in 1958. It may be of particular interest to
note that thirty-four of the cases appealed were taken to the
Seventh Circuit, twenty to the Second Circuit, twelve to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and fewer than
ten to each of the others.
The results on appeal are presented in the following table:

1

The study ranges from 163 F. (2d) 1 (1947) to 261 F. (2d) 440 (1959).
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Tliis statistical analysis would be incomplete without a review
of the same cases before the United States Supreme Court. At
the time of this ·writing eighteen of the cases had been before
the Supreme Court on the merits. In fourteen of them the result
in the court of appeals had been to cut down the breadth of the
commission's order in some way. Of the four court of appeals
decisiops which affirmed commission orders, the Supreme Court
sustained three. Of the other fourteen, the Court agreed with
the appellate court on six, but on eight entered an order more
favorable to the commission.
A final figure: at the conclusion of all appellate litigation,

2 The cases included here are ones in which the order of the FTC was wholly
affirmed.
8 This includes cases in which the findings of the FTC were sustained, but the scope
of the order was modified in some way. This classification includes those cases in which
there was any modification of the order.
4 This classification includes those cases in which the petition to review was completely sustained, thus amounting to a dismissal of the FTC's complaint for failure to
find substantial evidence to support any of the findings of the commission.
5 The cases grouped here include those in which the court failed to find substantial
evidence to support some part of the findings of the FTC. This may relate to a single
respondent or to a part of the findings against a single respondent, Thus, this category
includes those cases in which there has been affirmation of a part of the commission's
order.
6 This includes those cases which the court reviewed as an issue of law, found the
FTC to be in error, and reversed.
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respondent7 was required to cease and desist from some practice,
or the case was remanded to the commission for further proceedmgs, in 92 of the 107 cases.

I. Issues Available for Review on Appeal
Whether a reviewing court will even consider an issue raised
on appeal is preliminary to the type of review that will be afforded.
As recently as 1958 the Supreme Court indicated that a reviewing
court should not entertain a question not raised before the
commission. 8 This policy has been adhered to in the courts
below.9
One circumstance in which this problem could arise, which
is deserving of special attention, is where the hearing examiner
is reversed by the full commission and an appeal is subsequently
taken by respondent. In a recent case the hearing examiner
found that respondent's advertising was false and misleading,
but dismissed the complaint because in his view the practice
had been discontinued. In that posture of the case, only counsel
supporting the complaint appealed to the full commission. After
determining that the practices had not been discontinued, the
commission ordered respondent to cease and desist. Then respondent brought the action to the court of appeals. That court
refused to consider respondent's claim that the findings of the
examiner were unsupported by substantial evidence, saying that
the failure to file a cross-appeal to the commission prevented
respondent from raising this objection on appeal.1°

II.

Distinguishing Questions of Law and Fact

In analyzing the type of judicial review afforded in Federal
Trade Commission proceedings, it may be helpful to characterize the reviewing court's activity. Concern here is with determining what are questions of "fact," where judicial review is
limited, and what are questions of "law," where the scope of re7 "Respondent" is used throughout this paper to refer to the party opposing the
FTC without regard ,to the court involved or the party actually seeking review.
8 Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 at 414 (1958). See also United States v.
Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33 at 37 (1952).
9 See, e.g., 'Marlene's, Inc. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 556 at 558, and Barclay
Home Products, Inc. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 241 F. (2d) 451, cert. den. 354 U.S. 942 (1957).
10 American Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. FTC, (8th Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 289, cert.
den. 358 U.S. 875 (1958).
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view is much broader. It will be seen that calling an issue one
of "fact" or "law" is only the characterization of a result rather
than a tool used in determining the proper scope of review.
Turning first to the problem of determining what constitutes
an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or
practice, the Supreme Court stated in the early case of Federal
Trade Commission v. Gratz: "The words 'unfair method of
competition' are not defined by the statute and their meaning is
in dispute. It is for the courts, not the commission, ultimately
to determine as a matter of law what they include. . . ." 11
The same problem was before the Court in 1953 in Motion
Picture Advertising Service Co. v. Federal Trade Commission. 12
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, 13 reaffirmed the doctrine of the
Gratz case. Justice Douglas' majority opinion, however, can easily
be given a contrary meaning. 14 That opinion can be reconciled
with Gratz,15 but only if it can be said that the conflicting remarks
were addressed solely to the question of the remedy. This latter
interpretation is plausible, though unlikely, because the cases
he referred to dealt only with that point. 16 If what seem to be
Justice Douglas' views are accepted, however, it now appears
that whenever a "technical"17 unfair method of competition is
involved the courts will abdicate their function as expounded
in the Gratz case and simply rubber-stamp the commission.
11 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S.
12 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
13 Id. at 404.
14 "The precise impact of

421 at 427 (1920).

a particular practice on -the trade is for the Commission,
not the courts, to determine. The point where a method of competition becomes 'unfair'
within the meaning of the Act will often tum on the exigencies of a particular situation,
trade practices, or the practical requirements of the business in question." Majority
opinion of Justice Douglas, id. at 396.
15 Justice Douglas also said: "It is, we •think, plain from the Commission's findings
that a device which has sewed up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few falls within
the prohibitions of the Sherman Act and is therefore an 'unfair method of competition'
within the meaning of Section 5(a) of ·the Federal Trade Commission Act." Id. at 395.
16 Jacob Siegel v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 at 612 (1946), and FTC v. Cement Institute, 333
U.S. 683 at 726·727 (1948).
17 To distinguish a technical from a non-technical unfair method of competition it
is necessary only to compare the facts of the 'Motion Picture Advertising case with those
in Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), mod. 312 U.S. 668
(1941). In the former the issue was the impact of leases of advertising "trailers" to movie
houses for varying lengths of time. Knowledge of theater practices, costs and profits of
movie makers, and the total available market for advertising shorts were significant,
and an expert body might be better equipped to analyze such facts. In the latter case
one of the questions was more general, i.e., whether an incipient Sherman Act violation
could be an unfair method of competition.
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It may be that the opinion of Justice Stone in the 1934 case
of Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel & Bro.18 can be used
to explain these two conflicting opinions. Justice Stone approved
the Gratz doctrine, then noted that when the court is deciding
what is an unfair method of competition . "the determination
of the Commission is of weight." 19 The remainder of the opinion
is directed to the special competence of the commission to deal
with such matters and the expansibility of the phrase to include
novel methods not previously deemed illegal. The decision of
the Court was a reinstatement of the commission's order after
a reversal by the court of appeals. The practical answer ·may well
be that the commission's decision will usually be final. More
narrowly, it may be said that the courts of appeals generally
adhere to the commission's conclusion that a particular. practice
is an unfair method of competition, though in most of these cases
their decisions are arrived at through independent examination.20
In cases involving misrepresentations the courts ·are. more
willing to accept the conclusions of the commission,. but this
is apparently on the premise that it is clear that misrepresentations are unfair or deceptive acts or practices.21 Confirmation
that courts are arriving at independent conclusions as, to what
is an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive
act or practice occurs where the commission is reversed. This
has occurred, for example, when the question raised was whether
a particular scheme was a lottery22 and when the case involved
whether certain trade association activity was an unfair method
of competition.23
Since the statute defines the term "false advertisement,"24 and
provides that the dissemination of a "false advertisement'' by
certain means shall be an unfair or deceptive act or. practice,25
the broad policy question of what is within the phrase "unfair or
deceptive act or practice" is determined by Congress. Because of
this, judicial review in this area is ordinarily limited to. a review
18 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
Id. at 314.
20 See, e.g., Bennett v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 362 and Gay Games, Inc. v.
FTC, (10th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 197.
21See, e.g., Independent Directory Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 468, and
Kalwajtys v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 654, cert. den. 352 U.S. 1025 (1957).
22 J. C. Martin Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 530.
23 Tag Mfgrs. Institute v. FTC, (1st Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 452.
24 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §55a.
25 52 Stat. 115 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §52b.
19
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of the findings of fact, the principal findings being that the advertisement involved is in fact false, that it was disseminated as
prescribed by the statute, and that the order is proper.26 On
occasion, however, the courts have treated as questions of law the
issue whether an advertisement is false simply because it does
not point out the product's shortcomings27 and the effect of the
word "free" in an advertisement.28 On the other hand the Fourth
Circuit felt it was a question of fact whether an advertisement
that was technically true could be false. 29 No positive formula is
seen regarding when the courts will conclude one way or the other
in this particular area.
Another significant issue involves price discrimination under
the Robinson-Patman Act. A number of questions which have
arisen recently concern statutory interpretation, such as where
the burden of proof lies, and are clearly questions of which
the courts will make an independent determination. The establishment of a good faith defense was the subject of protracted
litigation recently involving the Standard Oil Company. The
Seventh Circuit on remand decided that whether respondent
had established a good faith defense was a matter of law, and it
then reversed the commission. 30 On certiorari, the Supreme Court
concluded this was a factual issue and accordingly limited its
review to a consideration of whether the court of appeals had
given the record a "fair assessment." This, it decided, had been
given.31
The Supreme Court's action in this case can be explained
by its statement in 1945 that "Congress has left to the Commission the determination of fact in each case whether the person, charged with making discriminatory prices, acted in good
faith to meet a competitor's equally low prices. The determination of this fact from the evidence is for the Commission. . . ." 32
The status of this point today, as far as the Supreme Court is
concerned, is apparently clear, although there are still other
unresolved fact questions concerning the scope of the defense.
26 See, e.g., Arrow Metal Products Corp. v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1957) 249 F. (2d) 88, and
Trade Union Courier Publishing Corp. v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1956) 232 F. (2d) 636.
21 Alberty v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 36, cert. den. 340 U.S. 818 (1950).
28 Book of the Month Club, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 486.
29 P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 52.
so Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 649, affd. 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
31 FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
32 FTC v. Staley Co., 324 U.S. 746 at 758 (1945).
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On the issue whether respondent's prices were actually discriminatory, the Second Circuit, in concluding that the practices
were lawful, stated: "The argument is also made that because
the Commission has _a special competence in the field of grocery
chain stores, its determination as to whether a given practice
violates the Robinson-Patman Act cannot be disturbed. The
expertise possessed by an administrative agency, however, does
not empower it to rewrite the laws which it has been charged
with enforcing. This is the function of Congress."33
In trying to ascertain an overall pattern in these cases it
might be well to distinguish between two types of statutory
language: that of a general nature, as "unfair methods of competition," and that which connotes a historic jural meaning,
as "good faith." In the former the language means little in the
skeleton form in which it comes from the legislature. It seems
proper for the courts to have the final say, as a matter of law,
on the substantial contents of the statute. This certainly must
have been the intention of Congress when it passed such a general
statute, for it has been accepted practice with regard to other
statutes as, for example, the Sherman Act. Additionally, it is
questionable if Congress would want to vest authority for such
interpretation of a statute in the agency that also acts as prosecutor under the statute. Moreover, the degree of expertise helpful
in arriving at a decision would not seem to be relevant. Thus,
it seems, the thirty-nine year old Gratz doctrine should still be
good law. On the other hand, when the statutory language itself has substantive meaning, such as "good faith," it seems
proper to relegate to the commission the question whether respondent's conduct fits into the required pattern. This might
explain why establishment of a good faith defense is considered
a fact question.

III. Judicial Review on the "Public Interest" Requirement
When acting pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission
Act, the commission is authorized to act only "if it shall appear
to the commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof
would be to the interest of the public." 34 The provision was first
Trading Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 365 at 374.
Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45b. No such requirement is specified when
the commission acts pursuant to the Clayton Act.
33 Atalanta
84 38
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before the Supreme Court in 1929 in Federal Trade Commission
v. Klesrter,3 5 when the Court affirmed a dismissal of the commission's complaint by the court of appeals. The Court said by way of
illustration, not as an exclusive enumeration, that the public
interest was involved when the unfair method threatened the
existence of present or potential competition, when the strong
were attempting flagrantly to oppress the weak, or when the
loss to a particular person was so small that no one individual
would bring an action to halt a practice that affected an entire
group.86 It noted that the commission exercised "a broad discretion" in its determination but that the public interest must
be "specific and substantial."87 After reviewing the facts, the
Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the requisite public interest was lacking, viewing the case as a private dispute between competing firms. 88 Four years later the Court made a
similar review on the public interest question, saying, "We also
are of the opinion that it sufficiently appears that the proceeding
was in the interest of the public."89 More recently the issue has
not been raised before the Supreme Court.
Decisions in the courts of appeals indicate that those courts
will sustain the decision of the commission regarding public
interest unless there has been an "abuse of discretion," this
phrase being employed to describe the Klesner doctrine. It
means, apparently, an inquiry into whether the commission
properly appraised the relevant factors. All four recent cases
that specifically raised the question sustained the conclusion of
the commission.40
While the Klesner approach has been used consistently by the
courts of appeals, it is at least arguable that their power to
review is not so broad. The statute puts the decision squarely

85 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
36Id. at 28.
37Ibid.
38 Compare American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79
(1956), where the Supreme Court limited its review under a similar statute to a considera•
tion of whether the Civil Aeronautics Board used appropriate criteria to determine
whether the proceeding was in the public interest.
39 FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 at 216 (1933). And see also FTC v. Algoma
Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 at 81 (1934).
40 ,Motion Picture Advertising Service Co. v. FTC, (5th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 633,
revd. on other grounds 344 U.S. 392 (1953); Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1952)
198 F. (2d) 404, cert. den. 344 U.S. 912 (1953); Dejay Stores, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1952)
200 F. (2d) 865; Standard Distributors v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 7.
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up to the commission, and it would seem that the reviewing
courts have exceeded their powers when they look to see if the
commission's discretion has been abused. Rather, it seems, judicial review should be limited to an inquiry into whether the
"appropriate criteria" have been considered by the commission,
especially in view of the Supreme Court's recent expounding of
this test under an analogous statute.41
IV.

Judicial Review on Questions of Fact

A. Background. The extent of judicial review on questions
of fact has undergone a significant change within the past decade.
The original practice under the Federal Trade Commission
Act was that commission findings were conclusive "if supported
by evidence."42 The procedure of the reviewing court was to look
only at one side of the record to see if it could ferret out sufficient
evidence to support the findings, paying no heed to what counterbalanced that evidence on the other side. This prompted Justice
Black to note in a 1937 decision that "the courts cannot pick
and choose bits of evidence to make findings of fact contrary
to the findings of the commission. The record in this case is
filled with evidence of witnesses under oath which supports the
commission's findings." 43 He reversed the court of appeals after
that court had upset the commission's findings. 44
The Administrative Procedure Act45 and its subsequent interpretation by the courts has brought about a change in the
extent of judicial review. Justice Frankfurter stated in Universal
Camera Corp. v. Labor Board46 that the "courts must now assume
more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of [agency]
decisions than some courts have shown in the past."47 He went
on to state that the reviewing court is charged with finding that

41 American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79 (1956). See
note 39 supra.
42 38 Stat. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45c. There is a similar provision in the
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §21.
43 FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112 at 117 (1937), motion to amend
opinion denied 302 U.S. 661 (1938).
44 For other cases that apply the same test, see, e.g., Consumers Home Equipment
Co. v. FTC, (6th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 972, and Excelsior Laboratory v. FTC, (2d Cir.
1948) 171 F. (2d) 484.
45 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1009e.
46 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
47 Id. at 490.
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the evidence as a whole supports the findings of the agency,
noting what detracts from the findings as well as what contributes to them. This analysis does not mean that the court may
run roughshod over the findings of the agency, for they "are
entitled to respect," 48 but it does mean that these findings must
be set aside when "the record before a Court of Appeals clearly
precludes the Board's decision from being justified by a fair
estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed
judgment on matters within its special competence or both." 49
B. A Review of Recent Courts of Appeals Affirmations. When
the reviewing court affirms the findings of fact made by the
commission, its emphasis is likely to be on the powers of the
commission. When the court overrules the commission, it is
more likely to note its own prerogatives. The cases cited in this
section are ones in which the reviewing court of appeals affirmed
the commission. They seem representative of the attitude of the
courts today.
Regarding admissibility of evidence, the rules used in the
federal courts are not rigidly adhered to in agency proceedings.50 Where the charge is made that evidence is incompetent,
the courts usually indicate that evidence is admissible though incompetent, but quickly point out that the evidence before them is
probably legally competent.51 This leaves some doubt as to how far
the courts will go in giving effect to clearly incompetent evidence.
The Administrative Procedure Act standard of "reliable, probative, and substantial"52 evidence will be of little help in particular situations until a body of case law is developed. U nfortunately, this may not occur too rapidly, for the courts have
taken the position that it is not reversible error to exclude
legally incompetent evidence which meets the new statutory
standard, 53 thus discouraging the raising of this question on
appeal. And on the other side of the coin, if the courts adhere
to the rule used in the district courts in non-jury cases that

48Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941), mod. on other grounds
312 U.S. 657 (1941).
61 See, e.g., Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 382, mod. 348
U.S. 940 (1955), and Buchwalter v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1956) 235 F. (2d) 344.
52 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1006c.
53 Doldn Corp. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 742, cert. den. 348 U.S. 981 (1955),
found in contempt for violation of order 247 F. (2d) 524 (1956).
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it is not reversible error to admit most evidence presented,54
the questionable evidence will be appraised only in cases where
that evidence tips the scales either way in the application of
the substantial evidence test.
Once it is determined that the evidence is properly before
the commission, "the weight to be given to the facts and circumstances admitted, as well as the inferences reasonably to
be drawn from them, is for the commission.''55 This rule prevents
a respondent who has lost before the commission from dragging
conflicting testimony into the courts to be reweighed, even
though the commission has completely disregarded certain testimony.56 The problem is usually presented when there is a
"battle of experts" over the ultimate fact in issue, and the
courts with unanimity adhere to the above cited rule.57 Thus
it appears that the substantial evidence test of Universal Camera
is met if the reviewing court is able to find that the conflicting
testimony accepted by the commission (plus other evidence supporting the same result) outweighs the evidence supporting
the opposite result, but without considering the conflicting testimony which the commission refused to adopt.
A similar problem arises in connection with the credibility
of witnesses, and the Second Circuit has indicated that this,
too, is a question for the commission and not the courts.58
The problem of the weight to be given expert testimony was
recently raised in several cases involving the down pillow industry.
Ten separate complaints on a false labeling charge were heard
simultaneously by an examiner. Each side presented an expert
witness to sustain its position, and each expert reported percentage
figures to support his testimony. The hearing examiner averaged
the figures of the two experts and concluded his hearing by dismissing three complaints. The commission determined that the
expert supporting its position should be ·sustained, so it gave no
54 See in this connection Judge Wyzanski's remarks in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 349 at 356.
55 This oft-cited statement appeared originally in FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade
Assn., 273 U.S. 52 at 63 (1927). For more recent repetitions, see, e.g., Steelco Stainless Steel
Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 693 at 697, and Standard Distributors v. FTC,
(2d Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 7 at 12.
56 E. Edelmann &: Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 152 at 155, cert. den. 355
U.S. 941 (1958).
57 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 58, and Koch v. FTC,
(6th Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 311.
58Standard Distributors v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 7.
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weight to the testimony of the expert opposing the complaint.
It issued an order against all ten respondents. The Second59 and
Third6° Circuits affirmed the commission. Judge Goodrich noted
that "we should not have done so had we been the Commission
but the responsibility for accepting the testimony of one qualified
expert and rejecting that of another is emphatically not a problem
for a Court of Appeals." 61 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit set
aside the cease and desist order in one case saying that the ex•
aminer properly averaged the conflicting figures. 62 The court's
analysis indicated that there was no basis for not giving effect
to the testimony of both experts, and it felt bound to do so. This
judicial intervention goes much farther than the mandates of the
Supreme Court indicate is proper, and would probably not be
followed in other circuits.
A related problem involves the effect of the immunity clause
in the Federal Trade Commission Act63 on testimony in agency
proceedings. In a 1956 case before the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia64 respondent agreed that it was proper for
him to testify, but argued that because of this testimony the
commission was precluded from issuing an order against him.
The court said that the statute did not immunize respondent from
a cease and desist order, for it was remedial, not punitive. It
would, however, be the basis for objecting to later criminal
prosecution.
Many cases can be cited where the commission acted by giving
effect to the hearing examiner's decision. In the case where
the hearing examiner's dismissal is reversed by the full commission
and the court of appeals affirms, its attitude is to minimize the
examiner's contrary result. The Fourth Circuit put it this way:
"It is the commission, not the trial examiner, that is charged
1vith ultimate responsibility for finding the facts; and it is the

59 Buchwalter v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1956) 235 F. (2d) 344.
60 Northern Feather Works v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1956) 234 F.
61 Id. at 336.
62 Burton-Dixie Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d)

(2d) 335.
166. In a companion case,

Lazar v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 176, it approved the averaging method but still

failed to find a basis for reversal.
63 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §49 provides ,that no person shall be excused
from testifying because his evidence "may tend to criminate ·him or subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture" but that he shall not be subjected to "any penalty or forfeiture"
for such testimony.
64 Drath v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 452, cert. den. 353 U.S. 917 (1957).
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commission's findings and order that we are authorized to review...." 65 As will be noted shortly the examiner gains greater
stature when the court reverses the commission in this situation.
Several cases made reference to the special competence of
the commission in upholding its decisions. In a false advertising
case before the Second Circuit that court upheld the finding of
the commission in the light of its "special expertise and responsibility."66 This expertise was again recognized a year later by
the same court when it said, "the Commission is not required
to sample public opinion to determine what meaning is conveyed
to the public by particular advertisements." Rather it could rely on
its own "expert experience in dealing with these matters." 67 And
in a case involving the Federal Communications Commission, Justice Reed was referring to all federal agencies when he said,
"Courts are slow to interfere with their conclusions when reconcilable with statutory directions." 68 The Ninth Circuit took
that to be an inhibition on the extent of its review. 69
Finally, it should be noted that the reviewing court starts
from the premise that the findings are properly supported. Thus
it is necessary for the appellant to call the attention of the court
to alleged errors, for the court will not search out undesignated
errors when a shotgun attack is made on the record below.70
C. A Look at the Reversals. The situation in which the court
of appeals is most likely to reverse the commission on questions
of fact appears to be when the commission has overridden a
dismissal by the hearing examiner. The Seventh Circuit scolded
the commission in the following manner when it reversed a dismissal by the examiner of part of a complaint: "The trial examiner made a very sensible and sound recommendation based
upon the entire record. It is difficult to understand why the
Commission did not follow his recommendation, instead of making
a mountain out of a pimple as they attempted to do in this

65 Bond Crown and Cork Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 974 at 979. And see
Goodman v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 584 at 601, where the court indicated that
the hearing examiner's findings were entitled to weight but that ,there was no mandate
for the commission to accept them.
66 Savitch v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 817 at 818.
67 E. F. Drew &: Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1956) 235 F. (2d) 735 at 741, cert. den. !152 U.S.
969 (1957).
68 United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 at 203 (1956).
69 Goodman v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 584 at 590.
70 Steelco Stainless Steel Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 693.
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case." 71 The commission argued on appeal that the hearing examiner's decision was not of interest to the court. This was
rejected, the court stating that it was as much a part of the record
as the complaint or the testimony. It is important to note that
the evidence on which the commission reversed the hearing examiner was in the record at the time that he made his decision.
The commission had simply given a different interpretation to
that testimony.
·
Another Seventh Circuit case involved an examiner's decision
that it would not be in the public interest to issue an order at
that time. The commission reversed in a single paragraph, after
adopting in toto the findings of the examiner. The court reviewed
the four facts recited in this paragraph, decided they were of
no help in altering the examiner's conclusion, and reinstated
his dismissal.72
Another type of situation in which the courts have reversed
commission orders in several instances involves a trade association or conspiracy case where a complaint was served on a number of different respondents. In both the Seventh73 and the
Second74 Circuits the appellate court showed a willingness to
review the evidence as to each particular respondent, and it
failed to find facts from which it could be inferred that certain
respondents were sufficiently aligned with the conspiracy charged.
The courts of appeals have reversed on several occasions after
carefully scrutinizing the record and failing to find any evidence
to support the findings or from which the commission could
draw the inferences that it did. 75 The more unusual situation
occurs when the court finds evidence to support the findings
or inferences drawn but determines that on the record as a whole
that evidence is not substantial.76 The Fourth Circuit vacated
71 Folds v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 658 at 661. The case involved a claim that
respondent's medication would remove pimples.
72 Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 246 F. (2d) 458. See also BurtonDixie Corp. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 166, and Minneapolis-Honeywell v. FTC,
(7th Cir. 1957) 191 F. (2d) 786, cert. dismissed 344 U.S. 206 (1952). It is worth noting that
all four of these cases arose in the Seventh Circuit.
78 Allied Paper Mills v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 600, cert. den. 336 U.S. 918
(1949).
74 Callaghan & Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1948) 163 F. (2d) 359, and Metropolitan Bag &
Paper Dist. Assn. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 341, cert. den. 355 U.S. 819 (1957).
75See, e.g., Prima Products v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 405; Stokely-Van
Camp v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1957) 246 F. (2d) 458; and Stenographic Machines, Inc. v. FTC,
(7th Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 755.
76See, e.g., Minneapolis-Honeywell Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d} 786 at
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an order when all the evidence supporting it had been taken
more than six years prior to its issuance, the court saying that
it was not substantial.77
An interesting problem recently arose in the Ninth Circuit.
Respondent advertised that its device for shoes was "scientific"
and "improved posture." The commission issued a cease and
desist order after concluding that this was false advertising. The
Ninth Circuit went along with the commission on the "scientific''
claim, saying that on a highly technical matter where experts
testified either way the commission could take its choice. But
on the "improved posture" claim the court felt that other evidence in the record so detracted from the commission's finding
that it was unsupported by substantial evidence.78 On certiorari,
the Supreme Court in just two sentences reinstated the entire
order of the commission.79 It could be argued that the Supreme
Court felt that the Ninth Circuit had re-evaluated the evidence
itself instead of simply applying the test of Universal Camera.
V.

Judicial Review on Scope of Order

A. Background. In appraising the extent of judicial review
of a Federal Trade Commission order it is important to note the
breadth of the statute. It provides that the reviewing court
shall have the power to make a decree "affirming, modifying, or
setting aside the order of the Commission...." 80 This language
makes it clear that the framers of the statute intended that the
courts of appeals have ultimate control over the remedy as well
as,other aspects of the case. This power was exercised by the Supreme Court in 1933 when it modified the scope of an order saying, "the orders should go no further than is reasonably necessary
to correct the evil and preserve the rights of competitors and
public...." 81 The classic exposition of the extent of the judicial
review, however, appears in Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade

792, cert. dismissed 344 U.S. 206 (1952), and Metropolitan Bag &: Paper Dist. Assn. v.
FTC, (2d Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 341, cert. den. 355 U.S. 819 (1957).
77 New Standard Publishing Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 181.
78 Sewell v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1956) 240 F. (2d) 228, revd. 353 U.S. 969 (1957).
79 FTC v. Sewell, 353 U.S. 969 (1957).
80 38 Stat. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45c. The same provision appears in the
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 735 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §21.
81FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 at 217 (1933).
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Gommission82 where Justice Douglas explained that the commission has a "wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed
adequate to cope with the unlawful practices" 88 and that the
courts will not interfere unless the commission has "abused its
discretion" 84 in the selection of a remedy.
The purpose of an order of the commission is not to penalize.
Rather its function is remedial, or "to stop the unfair practice"
as was indicated by the Seventh Circuit.85 With this in mind,
the pertinent cases will now be analyzed in order to determine
when the courts have felt that there has been an abuse of discretion.
B. Some Typical Orders. The reporters are full of cases
where the court failed to find an abuse of discretion. The Second
Circuit held that it was proper for the commission to order a
publisher to indicate clearly on the cover and in advertising
the fact that a reprinted story was abridged. It also approved an
order requiring the publisher to indicate the original title to
the story when that title had been changed in the republication.86
And more recently it stopped a respondent from soliciting advertising by mail because the presentation would be deceiving
if the recipient did not take time to read the material thoroughly.87 In a recent case the Supreme Court upheld a commission order which prohibited all respondents in a conspiracy
case from individually adopting a similar pricing system for
the purpose or effect of "matching prices of competitors." 88
On the other hand, an abuse of discretion was found when the
commission's order refused to allow respondent to indicate to
the public his old firm name in conjunction with a new name
he was required to select at the order of the commission; 89 and
another case modified a commission order involving false advertising, indicating that it was not within the power of the
commission to require respondent to state that his product

82 327
83 Id.

U.S. 608 (1946).
at 611.
84 Id. at 612.
85 Eugene Dietzen Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 321 at 331, cert. den. 323
U.S. 730 (1944).
86 Hillman Periodicals, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 122. For subsequent
confusion, see New American Library v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 143, alfd. after
remand to commission 227 F. (2d) 384 (1955).
87 Independent Directory Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 468.
88 FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
89 Gold Tone Studios v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 257.
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was valueless more often than not. 90 But it is noteworthy that
these two cases are the only ones found cutting down the scope
of the order by this direct method.
In contrast, in Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt
Co.91 the Supreme Court felt that the commission shifted too
much- responsibility to the courts. This was a price discrimination
case, and the commission's order allowed respondent to make
price differentials of up to five cents per case where they would
not "tend to lessen, injure or destroy competition." The Supreme
Court objected to this part of the order, saying that it amounted
to shifting to the courts issues "which Congress has primarily
entrusted to the Commission." 92
C. Some Peripheral Problems. As opposed to cases which
relate directly to the practices involved, there are others which
raise important peripheral problems with regard to the propriety of an order, including delaying its effective date and
determining the persons and practices properly reached.
Two recent cases before the Supreme Court have made it
clear that it is up to the commission to decide whether its order
shall be held in abeyance.93 In those cases, respondents argued
that making the order immediately effective against them, the
first two parties in the industry to be proceeded against, while
competitive firms were engaging in the same practices, would
force them out of business. The Court said that the decision of
holding up the effective date of the order was squarely up to
the commission and that it would not be overturned short of a
"patent abuse of discretion." 94
What parties can be reached by an order of the commission
has often been an issue on appeal. The situation arises when a
corporate respondent is wholly owned by a small group of
individuals, all active in the management of the corporation,
and joined with it as respondents. The Supreme Court held over
twenty years ago that it was proper to direct an order against
the individuals when the findings indicated that "further efforts
of these individual respondents to evade orders of the Com-

90 Alberty

v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 36, cert. den. 340 U.S. 818 (1950).
91334 U.S. 37 (1948).
92Id. at 54.
98 Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958), involving two cases consolidated
for hearing.
94 Id. at 414.
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mission might be anticipated. . . ." 95 Since it is clear that the
order to a corporation covers its active management,96 the very
fact that the individuals appeal indicates that they may attempt
to evade the commission's order, and this, as will be seen presently, should be sufficient basis to warrant extending it to include
them.
The cases in the courts of appeals reflect the same result.
The only difficulty seems to be in defining what activity of an
individual is sufficient to warrant an order against him personally. The Seventh Circuit upheld an order after noting that
the individual was "no ordinary employee and did direct and
have sufficient control of the policies and sales activities" of the
company.97 Judge Learned Hand said that the order may include
"those officers of a corporation who are in top control of the
activities that the Commission finds to have violated the Act." 98
A more drastic order was aimed at an individual who had
resigned as a corporate officer and director and disposed of his
stock in the corporation. The Second Circuit's reason for sustaining this order was that there were other unlawful ways for
him to conduct himself in the future. 99
Another important problem is what practices can be reached
by an order of the Federal Trade Commission. Turning first
to discontinued practices, it seems evident that abandonment
of the practice alone is no basis for dismissing the complaint.100
In addition, there must be "no reasonable likelihood" that the
discontinued practice will _be resumed, 101 and a reading of the
cases indicates that this test is rarely met. Two years' discon-

95 FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112 at 119 (1937), motion to amend
opinion den. 302 U.S. 661 (1938).
96 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 at 376 (1911).
97 Surf Sales Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1958) 259 F. (2d) 744 at 747. The Seventh Circuit
now adheres to the principle laid down in FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S.
112 (1937), motion to amend opinion den. 302 U.S. 661 (1938), but it has not always
done so. See R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 535, for a
contrary result. This was abandoned in Clayton Act proceedings in Anchor Serum Co. v.
FTC, (7th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 867, and finally under the Federal Trade Commission Act
in ,Mandel Bros., Inc. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1958) 254 F. (2d) 18, revd. on other grounds 359
U.S. 385 (1959).
98 Standard Distributors v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 7 at 15.
99 Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 404 at 408, cert. den.
344 U.S. 912 (1953).
100 FTC v. Goodrich Tire &: Rubber Co., 304 U.S. 257 (1938).
101 Automobile -Owners Safety Insurance Co. v. FTC, (8th Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 295
at 297, cert. den. 358 U.S. 875 (1958).
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tinuance alone is not enough,1°2 and neither is four. 103 Nor is a
longer period sufficient if other violations are continued.104 A
promise not to continue to act in the future is no justification
for dismissal of the complaint.105 On the other hand, a discontinuance in excess of six years prior to issuance of the complaint was deemed sufficient by the Ninth Circuit to warrant
setting aside an order, although the court suggested that passage
of time alone was not of determinative importance.106
The order of the commission may be directed at practices
related to those found to have been committed by respondent.
In 1951 the Supreme Court indicated that "the Commission is
not limited to prohibiting the illegal practice in the precise
form in which it is found to have existed in the past."107 Thus,
where respondent was found to have discriminated in price in
some of its products, an order directed at all products of like
grade and quality was sustained.108 Similarly, where an ice
cream producer was found to discriminate in price on one type
of ice cream cone in one limited area, the court sustained an
order directed at all ice cream cones sold by the producer everywhere. Justifying the result, the court said it was to "prevent
evasion" and halt practices "of the same general kind" that respondent had engaged in.100 And in a false advertising case it was
held proper for the order to proscribe advertising found false as
to products which respondent then had on the market and also
"substantially similar" products which might be marketed in
the future. 110 The court felt this was necessary in order to prevent
evasion by the simple expedient of changing the brand name.

102 C. H. Hunt Pen Co. v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 273.
103 Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, (8th Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 673.
104 Dejay Stores, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 865.
105 Goodman v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 584.
106 Oregon-Washington Plywood Co. v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1952) 194

F. (2d) 48. Cases
of this -type might also be explained by a failure to find substantial evidence, or :by a lack
of public interest.
107 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 at 4'13 (1952). This language was cited by
the Court during the present term when it reinstated an order of the commission acting
under the Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 1'15 (1951), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §69, which
enjoined certain practices of respondent related to other activity by it which the commission had found to be in violation of the statute. FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359
U.S. 385 (1959).
108 E. Edelmann &: Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 152, cert. den. 355 U.S. 941
(1958).
100 Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) '116 at '118.
110P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 52.
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It is important to note that orders of the FTC may properly
be directed at violations still in their incipiency.111 Indeed, this
was an important purpose of the statute, for the feeling of many
at the time of its passage was that the damage had been done by
the time a full-blown Sherman Act violation had occurred.112
Thus the commission is authorized to issue an order under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act113 though the
practices attacked have not fully matured.
There is also a group of cases in which the courts merely
clarify what the commission has done by its order. Thus, when
a commission order banned establishment of a single sales agent
for a group of producers, the court clarified the order so as only
to ban price-fixing arrangements through the medium of the
agent. 114 When an order of the commission is capable of different
interpretations, the court may modify it so that the meaning
is clear.115 However, one court refused to modify an order that
included the phrase "in substantial part." The court felt that
no interpretation was necessary, for if respondent would act
within the spirit of the law he would not come close to treading
in the proscribed area.116 It seems fair to conclude that when
respondent's good faith activity might run afoul of an ambiguous
order, the courts are willing to clarify and make the order more
explicit.

VI.

Power of Court of Appeals To Order Taking of
Additional Evidence

The Federal Trade Commission Act gives the court of
appeals discretion to order the adducing of additional evidence
before the commission, if it is material and if there are reasonable
grounds to excuse the failure to present it at the original hearing.117 Acting pursuant to this provision, the Supreme Court
111 Fashion -Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 at 466 (1941), mod.
312 U.S. 668 (1941).
112 See Justice Brandeis' dissent in FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 at 435 (1920).
113 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45a.
114 Virginia Excelsior Mills v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1958) 256 F. (2d) 538.
115 See, e.g., Hamilton iMfg. Co. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 346, and Bork
Mfg. Co. v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 611, for two different modifications of the
same order. See also Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 382, mod.
348 U.S. 940 (1955).
116Edward P. Paul & Co. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 169 F. (2d) 294.
117 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45c. A similar provision appears in the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §21.
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recently directed the Ninth Circuit to amend its judgment setting
aside an order of the commission and to direct the commission
to take additional evidence.118 The court of appeals had sustained respondent's claim that it was denied a fair hearing because
of lack of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The significance
of the Supreme Court decision is that the commission was authorized to reopen the entire case.
The Seventh Circuit has dealt less leniently with similar re~
quests by respondents. In a case involving price discrimination
respondent had urged that it was a part of the commission's case
to prove absence of cost justification. The court held the burden
was on respondent, and then refused its motion to put in the
additional evidence since it found no "reasonable ground" for
failure to do so originally.119 The decision of the court in refusing
to allow the adducing of additional evidence seems easier to justify
when respondent could claim only that it felt it would win on
other grounds and thought an offer of proof would be useless and
expensive.120
The attitude of the District of Columbia Circuit has been
more liberal. When subsequent to the hearing before the commission a clinical test and survey results became available for
the first time, the court allowed the motion to present these as
evidence before the commission at a later hearing. It did, however,
say that the commission's order, directed at advertising misrepresentations, would be effective pending the rehearing.121
VIL

The Impact of the Administrative Procedure Act

Apart from the Universal Camera situation there is apparently
but one instance in which a Federal Trade Commission case was

llSFTC v. Carter Products, Inc., 346 U.S. 327 (1953).
Canteen Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 433, revd. 346 U.S.
61 (1952). The case was reversed on the_ burden of proof question when respondent was
granted review by the Supreme Court, 346 U.S. 61 (1952). This indicates the Seventh
Circuit will not find "reasonable ground" when there is an honest difference in the
interpretation of the statute and in the evidence required. In contrast see Simplicity
Pattern Co. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 673 at 683, revd. on other grounds 27
U.S. LAW WEEK 4389 (1959), where the court of appeals did indicate that respondent
could put in additional evidence after the statutory ambiguity as to burden of proof
had been resolved.
120 Independent Grocers Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 941.
121 Dolcin Corp. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 742, cert. den. 348 U.S. 981
(1955), found in contempt for violation of order, 247 F. (2d) 524 (1956).
119 Automatic
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reversed because of the Administrative Procedure Act. In that
case the Eighth Circuit held that the requirements of section
5c of the act122 had not been met when the commission changed
hearing examiners in the middle of a case.123 The court felt the
original examiner had not become "unavailable" to the commission simply because he had reached retirement age. It.hinted
at some bungling in commission handling of the matter, and also
took care to note that the "retired" examiner was now working
for another government agency. In addition, the court indicated
the extreme importance of having the credibility evaluation made
by the examiner who heard the case.
Other respondents have not fared so well in relying on the
statute. One court felt the mandate of section 7c124 was violated
when certain scientific evidence was excluded by the examiner,
but it felt that refusal to admit evidence incompetent in a court
was not such a denial of "substantial justice" as would warrant
a reversal. 125 And the requirement of section ll 126 of the statute
was held not violated when an examiner was assigned out of
rotation for purposes of economy. 127
The absence of cases may be used as a basis for saying the
Administrative Procedure Act has had but limited effect. It seems
only fair to note two contrasting factors, however. First, this
study did not purport to reach all aspects of the statute, subpoenas among other things being omitted. Secondly, in some areas
the absence of cases may indicate explicit compliance with the
directive of the statute, as in the case of separation of functions 128
and burden of proof problems.129

122 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1004c, provides that the same officers who
preside at the reception of evidence "shall make the . • • initial decision • • • except
where such officers become unavailable to the agency."
123 Gamble-Skogmo v. FTC, (8th Cir. 1954) 2ll F. (2d) 106.
124 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1006c, says that "any oral or documentary
evidence may be received," that agency policy shall provide for the exclusion of "irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence," and that no order shall be issued
"except .•. in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence."
125 Dolcin Corp. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 742 at 749, cert. den. 348 U.S.
981 (1955), found in contempt for violation of order 247 F. (2d) 524 (1956). See notes 52,
53 and accompanying text.
126 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1010 indicates that examiners "shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable. • . ."
127 Tractor Training Service v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 420, cert. den. 350
U.S. 1005 (1956).
128 See Federal Trade Commission, Rules of Practice, May 1957, rule 3.15e.
129 Id., rule 3.14a.
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Conclusion

In concluding, some reference should be made to the statistics
presented at the outset. It would seem that, for several reasons,
over-emphasis should not be placed on the high percentage of
cases sustaining the commission. First, all the cases going before the
courts of appeals are ones which respondent lost initially, for the
commission does not, of course, seek review of cases in which it
has dismissed the complaint. Thus, only a portion of the commission's activity is seen by a review of appellate cases. Second, it is
probably true that in all areas the reviewing courts tend to affirm
the action below more often than not. Finally, with the commission limited as to both funds and manpower, it is natural for it to
proceed against the obvious violators first and either postpone
action against other possible violators until a later date when the
violation becomes more obvious or disregard it altogether.
Nevertheless, because it is an infrequent case in which respondent gets complete relief at the appellate level, the procedure
before the commission is of great importance in dictating the
final result. Adoption of several recommendations of the Hoover
Commission Task Force on Legal Services and Procedures would
assure a respondent of continued fair treatment before the commission and would also expedite and clarify the process of judicial
review. These recommendations include extension of the internal
separation of functions to include the process of final decision
by agency heads,130 alteration of the rules of evidence so as to
follow the same rules that are applied in the United States district
courts in non-jury cases,131 and limiting the power of review
of an initial decision by the agency to the powers that a reviewing
court would have and to matters of agency policy.132
-Recommendation 52 of the Task Force also deserves attention.133 It calls for a clarification of the scope of judicial review
on matters of agency discretion, fact issues, and mixed questions
of law and fact. In all three instances the Task Force calls for a
broader review by the courts. One result of acceptance of this
recommendation would be abandonment of the substantial evidence test of Universal Camera in favor of another standard,
180 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, Task
Force Report on Legal Services and Procedure, recommendation 41, p. 176 (1955).
131 Id., recommendation 47, p. 199.
132 Id,, recommendation 49, p. 203.
133Id., at p. 214.
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that of setting aside the findings of fact if clearly erroneous in
view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record. This is the standard applied when non-jury district
court proceedings are reviewed. This suggestion makes sense,
particularly when cognizance is taken of the fact that both the
commission and the district court are essentially similar triers
of fact. It would avoid the application of a double standard by
the court of appeals, one test for agency proceedings, another
for cases from the district court. It is perhaps quite reasonable
to take the position that the agency's fact-finding function in an
adjudicative hearing is no different from that of a district court.
This would seem to require an upgrading of the status of the
hearing examiner's initial decision and limiting the reviewing
power of the commission to that of an appellate court, for the
examiner would be regarded as in a position equivalent to that
of a district judge. Another result of adoption of these recommendations would be a clear authorization to the reviewing court
to make a de novo application of the law to the facts as found
in the course of its review of commission proceedings, a situation
the Task Force feels is at present somewhat unsettled.
A final, controversial recommendation of the Task Force to
be noted here is that calling for the creation of a Trade Section
of an Administrative Court to take over the adjudicative functions of the Federal Trade Commission.134 This would bring
about, in the view of the Task Force, "the more effective performance by the Federal Trade Commission of its essentially
administrative and regulatory functions." It further notes that
in trade regulation, "industry cooperation is more important than
industry prosecution." This recommendation would be important,
in view of the great significance of the agency fact-finding process,
if it could be shown that the present system was unsatisfactory.
However, the more recent cases reviewed in the course of this
comment do not give evidence of any judicial misgivings about
the present commission practices. As a matter of fact, the contrary seems to be the case, for otherwise it would seem likely
that the commission's findings would be upset with more frequency. Whether a trade court might be justified on grounds that
it would facilitate administration through centralization, effect
economy, or cause all trade cases to be heard before a single com- ·
184 Id.,

recommendation 64-, p. 250.
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petent tribunal is another matter. 185 But it does not appear that
the cases as a whole suggest that faulty performance by the Federal Trade Commission should be used as the reason for withdrawing its adjudicative functions.

David A. Nelson, S. Ed.

135 One point stressed by the Task Force Report is -that several other agencies currently handle a minimum number of trade cases annually, and the Task Force questions
their competence properly to handle those cases. The establishment of a trade court
would centralize handling of all these cases in a single expert tribunal. For two critical
views on the trade court, see Kintner, "The Trade Court Proposal: An Examination of
Some Possible Defects," 44 A.B.A.J. 441 (1958), and Freer, "The Case Against the Trade
Regulation Section of the Proposed Administrative Court," 24 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 637
(1956).

